

## The President



LRAR nº 2C 137 386 0347 4

Examination of the case:	Paris, on December 22 <sup>nd</sup> , 2021
No./Réf.:	CM214287
Case no. 21004812 (To be referenced in all correspond	dence)
Dear Mr. President,	
rotection authority (Commission n data protection officer of composition) 's complaint, transmitt from Bavaria pursuant to Article 56.  This complaint was about to	ges that took place between the services of the French data ationale de l'informatique et des libertés "CNIL") and the apany within the framework of the examination of ted to the CNIL by the German data protection authority 1 of the General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR").  The security and confidentiality of booking confirmation deed, stated that he had booked a hotel The emails confirmation of his reservation received in on December 3 <sup>rd</sup> , 7 <sup>th</sup> and 8 <sup>th</sup> , 2019 were
passing through the server	which was not using TLS protocol.
entrusted services relating notably to server benefited from the standard servers from your response that the recipient mail servers (google, yaho	ronic mail of April 1 <sup>st</sup> , 2021, your company specifies that anaged by the company to which has to the sending of electronic booking confirmations. This ettings recommended by your provider Thus, it TLS setting was indeed activated for the most common to, icloud). However, for other less common recipient server used by the complainant), this setting was not
On this issue, your company	argues that the systematic activation of the TLS protocol

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those contained in the booking confirmation, which are not of a sensitive nature".

for mail servers would be a practice mainly known in the banking sector. It would indeed be "likely to affect the performance of emails reception, which can be critical in the case of booking confirmations which, in addition to being required by the regulations, are very much expected by customers who want to be reassured that their purchase is going well". Your company adds that the absence of activation of the TLS protocol would imply attack capabilities that are not available to "mainstream" hackers and that "if successful, the sole concerned data would be

Yet, it belongs to the processor to implement "appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, including inter alia as appropriate (...) encryption of personal data" (Article 32.1.a GDPR).

In this case, the sender is more precisely required to ensure an end-to-end encrypted transport channel at "the state of the art", and this, for an end-to-end management of its electronic shipments. He must therefore guarantee an encrypted transport channel between its sending server ( and all recipients servers, such as the one here ( Indeed, the transmission of personal data through public networks shall be subject to security measures enabling to ensure its confidentiality and integrity. Therefore, the implementation of a protocol, such as the TLS protocol, enabling the encryption and authentication of data appears necessary in such context.

Therefore, by not providing an encrypted transport channel when sending the booking confirmation which included specifically spersonal data, has failed to comply with its security and confidentiality obligations provided under Article 32.1 of the GDPR.

However, I note that your company has of its own doing activated the TLS protocol on April 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2021 systematically in order to test the possible impact on performance. After a monitoring period, in the absence of regressions compared to the previous configuration, your company decided to keep this setting for sending its electronic communications. All sendings from the server are now carried out with the activated TLS protocol (screenshot provided in support).

In this respect, I would like to remind you that in order to guarantee in an optimal way the security of exchanged data, the TLS protocol must be associated with cryptographic chains that have no known vulnerabilities. That is why its version 1.3, which only offers state-of-theart cryptographic algorithms, should be privileged. For all intents and purposes, the French Agency for the Security of Information Systems (ANSSI) has published several security recommendations for the TLS protocol in its note version 1.2 of 03/26/2020, available at the following URL: <a href="https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/entreprise/guide/recommandations-de-securite-relatives-a-tls/">https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/entreprise/guide/recommandations-de-securite-relatives-a-tls/</a>.

The answers provided by your company, and in particular the measures taken by the latter, lead me, in agreement with other European data protection authorities concerned by the processing, to proceed to the closure of this complaint.

Yours Sincerely,

